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MENGELE'S BIRTHMARK: THE NUREMBERG
CODE IN UNITED STATES COURTS*
George J. Annas**
Experimentation on human beings is so difficult to justify that the attempt
is seldom even made. Usually its justification is simply assumed, and vague
notions of progress or national emergency are suggested as sufficient ratio-
nales. The United States, a society dedicated to both progress and human
rights, has been profoundly ambivalent about human experimentation. On
the one hand, we have consistently argued in our ethical codes that the
rights and welfare of research subjects must be protected; on the other hand,
we have consistently used perceived emergencies, both national and medical,
as an excuse to jettison individual rights and welfare in human
experimentation.
This article explores the ambivalence that is evidenced by the United
States judges at Nuremberg who condemned the brutal Nazi concentration
camp experiments of World War II, and by the United States judges since
Nuremberg who condoned experiments conducted in the United States dur-
ing the Cold War that cannot be justified under the terms of the Nuremberg
Code. Using the metaphor of the birthmark, the article suggests that it may
be inherent in man's nature to strive to surpass the boundaries of nature, and
to use both that instinct and the instinct for self-preservation as justifications
for even brutal experiments. Law and ethics have been no match for these
instincts, although our sad history should not deter us from trying to prevent
human experiments that betray our humanity and trample on the human
rights of subjects.
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS: FICTIONAL AND REAL RATIONALES
The most famous fictional experimenter of the nineteenth century, Na-
thaniel Hawthorne's Aylmer, killed his beautiful wife, Georgianna, in an ex-
* Adapted from The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts: Ethics vs. Expediency, in
THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (Oxford
University Press, New York) (G. Annas & M. Grodin eds. 1991) (in press). Copyright © 1991
by George J. Annas.
** Edward Utley Professor of Health Law and Director, Law, Medicine & Ethics Pro-
gram, Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health; B.A., 1967, Harvard College;
J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School; M.P.H., 1972, Harvard School of Public Health.
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periment designed to eliminate a birthmark from her left cheek. Aylmer
describes the birthmark, which is in the shape of a tiny human hand, as "the
visible mark of earthly imperfection."' His experiment to remove it, thereby
signifying "man's ultimate control over nature,"2 is the subject of Haw-
thorne's short story The Birthmark. Georgianna submits to his potion even
after she discovers that he has been concealing the danger of the experiment
to hide "the risk we run." Aylmer remains overconfident. Handing his wife
the goblet, he assures her, "Unless all my science have deceived me, it can-
not fail." 3 The potion, in fact, does succeed in removing the birthmark, but
only at the cost of his wife's life. As she dies, she remains his compliant
victim: "Do not repent, that, with so high and pure a feeling, you have
rejected the best the earth could offer." 4 The theme of overreaching man
attempting to control nature, with disastrous results, recurs in both Ameri-
can and English literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.'
It is not a fictional villain but a flesh-and-blood murderer, Josef Mengele,
who sets the modern standard for experimentation atrocities. By almost any
measurement, Mengele, the "Angel of Death," was one of the most notori-
ous of the Nazi physicians. Eyewitness accounts summarize the cold brutal-
ity and murder of this M.D.-Ph.D. "man of science." Some of his most
horrifying work involved genetically related experiments performed on chil-
dren who were twins, many of whom he personally murdered. In an affida-
vit, one of his prison assistants, Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, describes how Mengele
once killed fourteen Gypsy twins himself:
In the work room next to the dissecting room, fourteen Gypsy
twins were waiting and crying bitterly. Dr. Mengele didn't say a
single word to us, and prepared a 10 cc and a 5 cc syringe. From a
box he took Evipal and from another box he took chloroform,
which was in 20 cc glass containers, and put these on the operating
table. After that the first twin was brought in ... a fourteen year
old girl. Dr. Mengele ordered me to undress the girl and put her
head on the dissecting table. Then he injected the Evipal into her
right arm intravenously. After the child had fallen asleep, he felt
for the left ventricle of the heart and injected 10 cc of chloroform.
After one little twitch the child was dead, whereupon Dr. Mengele
1. N. HAWTHORNE, The Birth-Mark, in 10 THE CENTENARY EDITION OF THE WORKS
OF NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE 37 (1974).
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 53.
4. Id. at 55. See generally Fetterley, Women Beware Science: "The Birthmark," in LIT-
ERARY THEORIES IN PRAXIS 260 (S. Staton ed. 1987).
5. See, e.g., Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythol-
ogy, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 629-35 (1990).
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had her taken into the corpse chamber. In this manner all fourteen
twins were killed during the night.6
Dr. Nyiszli first observed this method of killing when it was used on four
pairs of twins, all under ten years of age. Mengele was interested in them
because three of the pairs had different colored eyes. He had them killed,
and their eyes and other organs were removed and shipped to the Kaiser
Wilhem Institute in Berlin, marked "War Materials-Urgent." 7
Following the War, the Allies sought to prosecute the major German war
criminals at Nuremberg. Mengele escaped to South America where he even-
tually died a natural death.8 His escape was made possible by the absence of
a Nazi "birthmark." When Mengele joined the S.S., he, like all of its mem-
bers, was required to have his blood group tattooed on his chest or arm.
Mengele managed to convince the S.S. that such a "birthmark" was unnec-
essary in his case because any competent surgeon would cross-match blood
types before a transfusion, and would never rely solely upon the tattoo. The
real reason for Mengele's refusal, as his wife later indicated, had to do with
his self-worship, which was on the order of Hawthorne's Aylmer. As
Mengele's wife described it, Mengele "had a habit of standing before a full-
length mirror and preening himself, admiring the smoothness of his skin...
that he had not wanted to mark."9 When captured after the war and ques-
tioned, he succeeded in convincing his captors that he was not an S.S. mem-
ber because he was not tattooed with his blood type.
Mengele's hidden "birthmark," his belief in racial hygiene, and his ruth-
less use of "inferior races" for his genetic experiments was much more dan-
gerous and diabolical than Georgianna's visible birthmark. Her natural
birthmark caused her to become a victim to "science." Mengele's hidden
and unnatural birthmark caused him to victimize others in the name of sci-
ence; and the absence of an artificial birthmark-the S.S. tattoo-permitted
him to escape responsibility for his crimes.
THE NUREMBERG CODE
Following the Do&tors' Trial (the "Medical Case"),"° which included
6. G. POSNER & J. WARE, MENGELE: THE COMPLETE STORY 39 (1986) (footnotes
omitted) (omission in original); see also P. Aziz, 2 DOCTORS OF DEATH: JOSEPH MENGELE:
THE EVIL DOCTOR (1976).
7. POSNER & WARE, supra note 6, at 39.
8. Curran, The Forensic Investigation of the Death of Josef Mengele, 315 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1071, 1073 (1986).
9. POSNER & WARE, supra note 6, at 63.
10. Twenty of the 23 defendants were doctors, charged chiefly with "crimes against hu-
manity" through jhe "killing or maiming of vast numbers of persons through medical experi-
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charges of conducting lethal studies of the effects of high altitude and ex-
treme cold, the action of poisons, and the response to various induced infec-
tions,"1 the court issued "The Nuremberg Code" as a summary of the legal
requirements for experimentation on humans. 2 The Code requires that the
mentation." J. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 141
(1954).
11. 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 11-14 (1946-1949) (listing war crimes charged in
Count Two of Oct. 25, 1946 Indictment).
12. The complete text of the Nuremberg Code is as follows:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the
intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;
the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possi-
bly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon
each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal
duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary
in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experi-
mentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem
under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experi-
ment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and
mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe
that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where
the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the hu-
manitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect
the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or
death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons.
The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the
experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to
bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where
continuation of the experiment seemed to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably [sic) cause to believe, in the
exercise of the good faith, superior skill .and careful judgement required of him that a
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informed, voluntary, competent, and understanding consent of the research
subject be obtained. Although this principle is placed first in the Code's ten
points, the other nine points must be satisfied before it is even appropriate to
ask the subject to consent.
The Nuremberg Code is the "most complete and authoritative statement
of the law of informed consent to human experimentation."' 3 It is also
"part of international common law and may be applied, in both civil and
criminal cases, by state, federal and municipal courts in the United States." 4
However, even though courts in the United States may use the Nuremberg
Code to set criminal and civil standards of conduct, none have used it in a
criminal case and only a handful have even cited it in the civil context. Even
where the Nuremberg Code has been cited as authoritative, it has usually
been in dissent, and no United States court has ever awarded damages to an
injured experimental subject, or punished an experimenter, on the basis of a
violation of the Nuremberg Code.
There have, however, been very few court decisions involving human ex-
perimentation. It is therefore very difficult for a "common law" of human
experimentation to develop. This absence of judicial precedent makes codes,
especially judicially-crafted codes like the Nuremberg Code, all the more
important. Moreover, since World War II, American governmental officials
have evidenced a profound ambivalence with regard to human experimenta-
tion. On the one hand, Nazi physicians and scientists were punished and
their brutality was publicized to deter future violations of human rights in
medical experimentation, thus evidencing a sincere and serious desire to pro-
tect human rights in human experimentation. On the other hand, at the
Tokyo War Crime Trials, our Government made a deal with the Japanese
military medical officers who conducted lethal biological warfare experi-
ments on United States prisoners of war in China during World War II.
They agreed to disclose the results of their experiments to the United States
military in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 5 This action was
based upon an expedient, utilitarian ethic that accepted information, regard-
less of its source, to protect our national security in a world that was viewed
continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the
experimental subject.
2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 181-82 (1946-1949).
13. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMEN-
TATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 21 (1977).
14. Id.
15. See generally A. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE TOKYO WAR CRIME TRIALS (1987); P. WILLIAMS & D. WALLACE, UNIT 731: JAPAN'S
SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR 11 (1989).
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as hostile to the United States. This tension between protecting individual
rights and protecting the national security has often been decided in favor of
the national security during the Cold War.
Any meaningful study of the role of the Nuremberg Code in American
law requires an examination of pre-Nuremberg litigation involving human
experimentation, reaction to the Nuremberg Code as a legal document, and
a discussion of the handful of United States cases that have cited the Nurem-
berg Code, directly or indirectly, since the War.
PRE-NUREMBERG APPELLATE DECISIONS
Although a distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research
is now commonly made, United States courts prior to World War II made
no such distinction. 16 Court cases alleging "experimentation" all involved
novel treatments for illness. Experimentation was often defined as a "devia-
tion" from standard medical practice that could only be justified by its
results.
A Missouri court, for example, describing in 1926 a physician who used
an injection for hemorrhoids, held: "A failure to employ the methods fol-
lowed or approved by his school of practice evidences either ignorance or
experimentation on his part. The law tolerates neither."' 7 It was not until
the Depression that the Supreme Court of Michigan first mentioned the role
of consent in experimentation:
We recognize the fact that if the general practice of medicine and
surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount of experi-
mentation carried on; but such experiments must be done with the
knowledge and consent of the patient or those responsible for him
and must not vary too radically from the accepted method of
procedure. 18
Two cases, decided at the beginning of World War II, demonstrate both a
new appreciation for the role of experimentation in medical progress by
16. This is not to say that there were no nontherapeutic experiments conducted in the
U.S. prior to the War, only that none of the participants in these experiments brought lawsuits
that generated an appellate record. The Tuskegee Syphilis study, for example, began in 1932
and continued until 1972, but no lawsuits were filed until the 1970's. See J. JONES, BAD
BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981); cf. Begay v. United States, 591 F.
Supp. 991 (D. Ariz. 1984) (Navajo uranium miners subjected to prospective epidemiological
study), aff'd, 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985).
17. Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 223, 281 S.W. 682, 685 (1926).
18. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935) (emphasis added)
(plaintiff suffering in latent stages of syphilis was originally misdiagnosed and treated for can-
cer). This and other pre-World War II cases on human experimentation in the United States
are discussed in more detail in ANNAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 13, at 2-6.
Mengele's Birthmark
United States courts and a new insistence on the consent of the patient or
subject. In the first, a physician's license was suspended for fraud and deceit
after using a topical medication for face cancer. The medication had been
developed by another patient of the physician and was used only after the
physician had tried it on himself to be sure there were no side effects. He
had informed the patient that the treatment was experimental, that it might
do some good, and could not do any harm. A complete cure was effected.
In reversing the licensing board's decision to suspend his license for fraud, a
New York court said:
It is not fraud or deceit for one already skilled in the medical art,
with the consent of the patient, to attempt new methods when all
other known methods of treatment had proved futile and least of
all when the patient's very life has been despaired of. Initiative and
originality should not be thus effectively stifled, especially when un-
dertaken with the patient's full knowledge and consent, and as a
last resort. 19
The second early World War II case is the only nontherapeutic experimen-
tation case decided by a United States court prior to the articulation of the
Nuremberg Code. It involved a fifteen-year-old junior high student, John
M. Bonner, whose cousin had been severely burned and was in a charity
clinic in Washington, D.C.2 ° After several failed attempts to find a skin
graft donor, his aunt persuaded the boy to go to the hospital. A surgeon,
Robert Moran, eventually cut a "tube of flesh" from his armpit to his waist,
and surgically attached it to his cousin, forming a literal flesh and blood
bond between them. The attempt to nurture the skin transplant with the
boy's blood was unsuccessful, and the tube itself was severed when young
Bonner lost so much blood he required transfusions. He was in the hospital
for two months. The trial court found that Bonner was sufficiently mature
to consent to the experiment and had in fact consented. The appeals court
agreed, stating that there were times when a minor was sufficiently emanci-
pated or mature to consent to beneficial medical treatment, but held that
these exceptions to the requirement of informed consent of a parent did not
apply in the nontherapeutic context:
Here the operation was entirely for the benefit of another and in-
volved sacrifice on the part of the infant of fully two months of
schooling, in addition to serious physical pain and possible results
affecting his future life. This immature colored [sic] boy was sub-
jected several times to treatment involving anesthesia, blood let-
19. Stammer v. Board of Regents, 262 A.D. 372, 373-74, 29 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1941) (em-
phasis added), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 359, 39 N.E.2d 913 (1942).
20. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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ting, and the removal of skin from his body, with at least some
permanent marks of disfigurement. 21
Accordingly, this pre-Nuremberg Code case held that if both the mature
minor and the parent consent to nonbeneficial or nontherapeutic experimen-
tation of this kind, it may be performed legally.
REACTION TO THE NUREMBERG CODE
The first United States court decision to cite the Nuremberg Code was
decided in 1973, more than twenty-five years after the Code had been
promulgated. This is striking because all of the judges at the Doctors' Trial
were Americans, the prosecutors were American, the procedural rules fol-
lowed were American, and the case itself was brought under the authority of
the Military Governor of the American Zone. Why wasn't the Nuremberg
Code immediately adopted by United States courts as setting the minimum
standard of care for human experimentation?
One reason, perhaps, is that there was little opportunity. As remains true
today, almost no experiments resulted in lawsuits in the 1940's, 50's, and
60's. A second reason may be that the Nazi experiments were considered so
extreme as to be seen as irrelevant to the United States. This may explain
why our own use of prisoners, the institutionalized retarded, and the men-
tally ill to test malaria treatments during World War II was generally hailed
as positive, making the war "everyone's war.'"22 Likewise, in the late 1940's
and early 1950's, the testing of new polio vaccines on institutionalized men-
tally retarded children was considered appropriate.23 Utilitarianism was the
ethic of the day.
Distancing the denial of any link to the Nazi atrocities also characterized
the reactions of the medical community to the Nuremberg Code. Noting
that the Code applied primarily to the type of outrageous nontherapeutic
experiments conducted during the war, physician groups tended to find the
Code too "legalistic" and irrelevant to their therapeutic experiments, and set
about to develop an alternative code to guide medical researchers. The most
successful and influential has been the World Medical Association's (WMA)
Declaration of Helsinki, adopted in 1964 and amended three times since.
The World Medical Association was formed in 1946 at the headquarters of
21. Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
22. Rothman, Ethics and Human Experimentation: Henry Beecher Revisited, 317 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1195, 1197 (1987) (quoting N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1945, at 30, col. 1).
23. See, e.g., R. CARTER, BREAKTHROUGH: THE SAGA OF JONAS SALK 123-237 (1966);
Koprowski, Jervis, Norton & Nelsen, Further Studies on Oral Administration of Living Polio-
myelitis Virus to Human Subjects, 82 PROC. Soc'Y EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 277,
277-80 (1953).
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the British Medical Association in London, where physicians from Western
Europe had been meeting informally during World War II. The hope was
that should war ever come again, "the action of the World Medical Associa-
tion in this field will act as a brake upon medical war crimes." 24
In 1954 the WMA's Eighth General Assembly met in Rome and adopted
five general Principles for Those in Research and Experimentation, including:
3. Experimentation on Healthy Subjects. [Subjects should] be fully
informed. The paramount factor in experimentation on human be-
ings is the responsibility of the research worker and not the willing-
ness of the person submitting to the experiment.
4. Experimentation on Sick Subjects. [O]ne may attempt an opera-
tion or a treatment of a rather daring nature. Such exceptions will
be rare and require the approval either of the person or his next of
kin. In such a situation it is the doctor's conscience which will
make the decision.
5. Necessity of Informing the Person .... It should be required that
each person who submits to experimentation be informed of the
nature of, the reason for and the risk of the proposed experiment.
If the patient is irresponsible, consent should be obtained from the
individual who is legally responsible for the individual. In both
instances, consent should be obtained in writing.25
The differentiation between "healthy subjects" and "sick subjects," and
the general approval of proxy consent, depart from Nuremberg's sole em-
phasis on nontherapeutic experiments. Hugh Clegg, editor of the British
Medical Journal, was given the task of drafting a new code. In a 1960 arti-
cle, Clegg reviewed the Nuremberg Code with general approval, but con-
cluded that Hippocrates was the real guide: "So long as the research worker
is imbued with the Hippocratic ideal, this and his conscience should be a
sufficient guide."2
6
Perhaps the most important single event that helped push final adoption
of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki was the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's (FDA) proposal to standardize research on experimental drugs in the
United States following the thalidomide tragedy. The advent of large scale
drug trials in the United States and around the world made it necessary to
address the issue of human experimentation in a far different context than
either the Nazi concentration camp model or the simple Hippocratic doctor-
24. Routley, Aims and Objects of the World Medical Association, 1 WORLD MED. A.
BULL. 18, 19 (1949).
25. World Medical Association, Human Experimentation, 2 WORLD MED. J. 14, 14-15
(1955) (Organizational News).
26. Clegg, Human Experimentation, 7 WORLD MED. J. 77, 79 (1960). The Hippocratic
Oath has nothing to say about human experimentation.
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patient relationship model. Subtitled Recommendations Guiding Doctors in
Clinical Research, the Helsinki Declaration of 1964 was simply this: Recom-
mendations to physicians by physicians.
By the early 1970's the Helsinki Declaration was widely admired by phy-
sicians as an advance over the Nuremberg Code. Perhaps Henry Beecher
expressed the physician's view best when he said in 1970:
The Nuremberg Code presents a rigid set of legalistic demands....
The Declaration of Helsinki, on the other hand, presents a set of
guides. It is an ethical as opposed to a legalistic document, and is
thus a more broadly useful instrument than the one formulated at
Nuremberg. ... Until recently, the Western world was threatened
with the imposition of the Nuremberg Code as a Western credo.
With the wide adoption of the Declaration of Helsinki, this danger
is apparently now past.27
Similarly, the President of the Council for International Organizations of
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) argued in 1967 that: "On the whole [the Decla-
ration of Helsinki] corrects what in the Nuremberg Rules was circumstan-
tial, related to Nazi crimes, and places those Rules more correctly in the
context of generally accepted medical traditions."2
On the other hand, Jay Katz argued insightfully in 1973 at an interna-
tional CIOMS conference:
Do not place too much reliance on codes of ethics, such as the
Declaration of Helsinki. That would be dangerous. Codes are de-
ceptive documents to which all of us probably could subscribe in
principle; but if you study them carefully, you will find that they
are painfully vague. They do not inform us well about actual deci-
sion [sic] which investigators have to make day after day. The
Declaration of Helsinki, analogous to a legal statute, requires op-
portunities for interpretation; only then could it become a viable
document.29
The only authoritative forum for interpretation of a "code" is the court-
27. Refshauge, The Place for International Standards in Conducting Research on Humans,
55 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 133, 137 (2 Supp. 1977) (Proceedings of the International
Conference on the Role of the Individual and the Community in the Research, Development,
and Use of Biologicals) (emphasis added) (quoting H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDI-
VIDUAL: HUMAN STUDIES 279 (1970)).
28. Id. at 136. A 1964 physician-observer agreed, saying, "I think we must read the Nu-
remberg Code in reference to the conditions under which it was written. This is a wonderful
document to say why the war crimes were atrocities, but it is not a very good guide to clinical
investigation which is done with high motives." Beeson, Bondy, Donnelly & Smith, Panel
Discussion: Moral Issues in Clinical Research, 36 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 455, 464 (1964).
29. C.I.O.M.S., PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECH-
NOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 247 (1974).
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room. Such interpretation began, coincidentally, the same year Professor
Katz called for it: 1973.
THE NUREMBERG CODE IN LOWER U.S. COURTS
Prior to 1973, the Nazi doctors were alluded to only in a dissenting opin-
ion in Strunk v. Strunk,3° a Kentucky case decided by a vote of 4 to 3, in
which the removal of a kidney from an institutionalized mentally retarded
adult was authorized for transplant into his brother, justified on the basis
that the "donation" would be "beneficial" to the donor. In dissent, Judge
Steinfeld wrote:
Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a government
which, to the everlasting shame of its citizens, embarked on a pro-
gram of genocide and experimentation with human bodies I have
been more troubled in reaching a decision in this case than in any
other. My sympathies and emotions are torn between a compas-
sion to aid an ailing young man and a duty to fully protect unfortu-
nate members of society."1
The lawyer for the widow of the recipient of the world's first artificial
heart, Haskell Karp, tried to introduce the Nuremberg Code into evidence in
a malpractice case following the 1969 implant. He failed when the United
States District Court judge, John V. Singleton, ruled that the Nuremberg
Code was irrelevant because the artificial heart was implanted to save Karp's
life, and was, therefore, not experimental, but therapeutic.3 2
The first United States case to actually make use of the Nuremberg Code
was a 1973 Detroit, Michigan case involving psychosurgery. 3 Although not
precedent anywhere outside Detroit, the case drew national attention be-
cause of the then current political debate surrounding psychosurgery (the
destruction of histologically normal brain tissue for the purpose of modify-
ing undesirable behavior). In 1972 two psychiatrists had obtained state
funds to study the effects of amygdalotomy (the destruction of a portion of
the brain's limbic system) and cyproterone acetate (an antiandrogen) on
male aggression in prisons and mental health facilities. The goal was to
modify antisocial behavior so that inmates could be safely released to the
community. The study protocol was approved by both a scientific review
30. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
31. Id. at 149 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
32. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974) (experimentation "measured by
traditional malpractice evidentiary standards;" Nuremberg Code not addressed).
33. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't Mental Health, No. 73 Civ. 19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, July 10, 1973) (unreported), reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902 (1974).
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committee and a human rights committee. Twenty-four candidates were
sought for the study, but only one, Louis Smith, was considered suitable. He
had been confined in a Michigan state hospital as a criminal sexual psycho-
path for seventeen years, having been charged with (but never tried for)
murder and rape. He and his parents had signed a detailed consent form
when a lawsuit was commenced by a public interest group to halt the pro-
posed experiment.
In considering the challenge, the panel of three lower court judges focused
on whether involuntarily confined individuals could ever legally consent to
experimental brain surgery designed to alter aggressive behavior. In decid-
ing how to answer this question the court reprinted the entire text of the
Nuremberg Code for "guidance," saying:
In the Nuremberg Judgment, the elements of what must guide us
in decision are found. The involuntarily detained mental patient
must have legal capacity to give consent. He must be so situated as
to be able to exercise free power of choice without any element of
force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of
restraint or coercion. He must have sufficient knowledge and com-
prehension of the subject matter to enable him to make an under-
standing decision. The decision must be a totally voluntary one on
his part.34
Applying these standards, the court concluded that Smith could not give
voluntary, competent, informed, or understanding consent to the procedure;
consequently, the experiment could not be performed. The court went fur-
ther: it determined that given the current state of knowledge no one could
give an understanding consent to this procedure, effectively outlawing it in
Detroit, Michigan. This opinion has been justifiably criticized on a number
of grounds, but its use of the Nuremberg Code as a standard for judgment
has not been one of them. Shortly after this case, a California appeals court
ruled that portions of a statute regulating psychosurgery were unconstitu-
tional because they were "impermissibly vague."3  The Nuremberg Code
was not mentioned.
The next United States judge to mention the Nuremberg Code was Judge
Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court in dissent in a 1980 employment
case involving alleged wrongful discharge.36 A physician, Grace Pierce, had
been employed as Director of Medical Research/Therapeutics of Ortho
34. Id. at 913. For a detailed analysis of the legal regulation of psychosurgery, see AN-
NAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 13, at 215-55.
35. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 545 (1976).
36. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 80-82, 417 A.2d 505, 516-18 (1980)
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
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Pharmaceuticals. Her primary responsibility was to oversee the develop-
ment of new drugs. In 1975 she was the only physician on a team develop-
ing loperamide, a liquid drug for treating diarrhea, which contained
saccharin. The team was preparing an Investigational New Drug (IND) ap-
plication for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Pierce objected to
continued development of the drug because she believed saccharin was a risk
to children and the elderly, and therefore it would violate her interpretation
of the Hippocratic Oath to test it on them. She was removed from the loper-
amide project and subsequently resigned. In her lawsuit against Ortho she
alleged that the company had required her to act contrary to the Hippocratic
Oath, specifically the part that reads, "I will prescribe regimen for the good
of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm
to anyone.
' 37
The New Jersey Supreme Court found her reliance on an ethical code too
vague because, the FDA had yet to approve the IND application, and until
they did so, no one would be given the drug, and no harm could be done. In
the court's words: "The case would be far different if Ortho had filed the
IND, the FDA had disapproved it, and Ortho insisted on testing the drug on
humans. The actual facts are that Dr. Pierce could not have harmed anyone
by continuing to work on loperamide."
38
The court characterized a disagreement at this point of the IND process
as a "difference in medical opinions" at Ortho, and concluded that uphold-
ing her claim would lead to chaos in drug development and would harm
research:
Dr. Pierce espouses a doctrine that would lead to disorder in drug
research. Under her theory, a professional employee could redeter-
mine the propriety of a research project even if the research did not
involve a violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Chaos
would result if a single doctor engaged in research were allowed to
determine, according to his or her individual conscience, whether a
project should continue.39
In dissent, Judge Pashman argued that codes more specific than the Hip-
pocratic Oath provided Pierce with a "clear public policy" mandate, and
that she should at least have the opportunity to present to a jury these "rec-
ognized codes of medical ethics that proscribe participation in clinical exper-
imentation when a doctor perceives an unreasonable threat to human
health."' Judge Pashman then quoted the Helsinki Declaration, the Ameri-
37. Id. at 74, 417 A.2d at 513.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 75, 417 A.2d at 514 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 77, 417 A.2d at 515 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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can Medical Association ethical guidelines for clinical investigation, and the
Nuremberg Code.4' Of Nuremberg he said, "A final source of ethical guide-
lines is what is now called the 'Nuremberg Code.' . . The Judicial Council
of the American Medical Association has adopted the Nuremberg Code as
one expression of ethical principles governing human experimentation."42
He then set forth the text of principles 5, 6, 7, and 10,4 and concluded by
noting that the Nuremberg Code "conditions a doctor's participation [in ex-
perimentation] on his 'good faith, superior skill and careful judgment' that
the experiment is safe."'
THE COLD WAR MENTALITY AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
The Michigan psychosurgery case and the New Jersey wrongful discharge
dissent both cite and reprint all or part of the text of the Nuremberg Code
itself. The next case deals with an "experiment" that might be considered
"uncivilized" by any code. It is included because of its relevance to military
experiments; however, the "Nuremberg Code" the court refers to is actually
the Nuremberg Principles derived from the first war crimes trial.45 This case
41. Id. at 78-80, 417 A.2d at 515-17.
42. Id. at 80, 417 A.2d at 516.
43. Id. at 80, 417 A.2d at 516-17.
44. Id. at 82, 417 A.2d at 518.
45. See Mueller, Four Decades After Nuremberg: The Prospect of an International Crimi-
nal Code, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 499, 499-500 (1987). "[T]he International Law Commission
formulated the Principles of International Law recognized in the charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal[;] [w]hile the instrument.., does not constitute
international law as such, it evidences ... the continuing effect of the customary law of Nu-
remberg .... Id. at 500 (footnote omitted). In 1947 the General Assembly's Committee on
the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification recommended that the
International Law Commission prepare a draft code incorporating the Nuremberg principles
as well as a general plan for the codification of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, in 1 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
302 (D. Djonovich ed. 1973). In 1950 the Commission presented its first formal report. The
text of that report is the first attempt to codify the Nuremberg principles:
Principle I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under inter-
national law is responsible therefor and liable for punishment.
Principle II. The fact that international law does not impose a penalty for an act
which constitutes crime under international law does not relieve the person who
committed the act from responsibility under international law.
Principle III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible government official
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of
a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided
a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
Principle V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right
to a fair trial on the facts and law.
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is also the first of a series of cases that appear to justify the brutal experimen-
tation needed to fight the Cold War.
A suit was brought by a former United States soldier alleging that in 1953,
only five years after the Nuremberg Code was promulgated, he and other
members of his unit were ordered to stand in a field without protection from
radiation while a nuclear device was exploded in the Nevada desert.46 As a
result of this exposure, the plaintiff, Stanley Jaffee, died of cancer in Novem-
ber 1977."7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit de-
cided that Jaffee's claim for compensation for an intentional and
unconstitutional tort was barred by the Feres4 8 doctrine,4 9 which holds that
"soldiers 'injured in the course of activity incident to service' may not sue for
Principle VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under interna-
tional law:
a. Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assur-
ances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
b. War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are
not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.
c. Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecu-
tions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against
peace or any war crime.
Principle VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime,
or crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international
law.
Report of the International Law Commission, 12 U.N. GAOR 11-14 (12 Supp. 1950) (U.N.
Doc. A/1316).
In 1954 attempts first began to go beyond the Nuremberg Principles and establish an inter-
national criminal code that would be administered both nationally and internationally by an
international criminal court. Work on this project stalled almost immediately and was not
revived until 1978. Mueller, supra, at 500. Currently the attempt is not to simply restate the
1954 aims, but to move beyond the
three basic crime categories, namely crime against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. Rather, it should extend to more recent international crimes such
as colonialism, apartheid, serious environmental offenses, economic aggression,
mercenarism, hostage taking, violence against persons enjoying diplomatic privileges
and immunities, the hijacking of aircraft, international terrorism, and piracy.
Id. at 502.
46. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982).
47. Id.
48. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
49. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1227-28.
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additional compensation .. .under the Federal Tort Claims Act." 50 Re-
sponding to an argument by the minority that the actions of the United
States military in this case were a violation of many international standards,
including the Nuremberg Code, the court said: "The majority neither en-
dorses nor sanctions a concentration camp mentality .... [W]hat we are
called upon to decide is simply whether the plaintiffs are entitled to money
damages .... " 5'
The dissenting judges thought that requiring soldiers to stand near the
explosion of a nuclear device without protection against radiation was "a
violation of human rights on a massive scale." '52 They noted that the allega-
tion is that "civilian and military officials of the government, acting without
legal authority and with no sufficient legitimate military or other purpose,
conducted a human experiment upon soldiers subject to their control, with-
out their knowledge, permission or consent, by exposing them to radiation
which those officials knew to be dangerous."53 The dissent continued, argu-
ing that no law should place the plaintiffs beyond its protection because this
conduct went "beyond the bounds of social acceptability." 54 In their words:
[T]he complaint alleges conduct which would violate the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the Geneva Convention, the Declaration on
the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
and the Nuremberg Code. The international consensus against in-
voluntary human experimentation is clear. A fortiori the conduct
charged, if it occurred, was in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States and of the state where it occurred or
where its effects were felt. 55
The dissenters expressed astonishment that "any judicial tribunal in the
world, in the last fifth of this dismal century, would choose to place a class of
persons outside the protection against human rights violations provided by
the admonitory law of intentional torts." ' 56
The dissenters would have been even more astonished when, three years
later, a federal district court judge treated the Nuremberg Code simply as a
discussion document without legal force in the United States. That court
50. Id. (citation omitted) (referring to Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) and
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977)).
51. Id. at 1240.
52. Id. at 1248 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1249.
55. Id. at 1249 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 1250.
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also adopted one of the Nazi defenses as legitimate: In times of national
emergency, research rules must take a backseat to national security. Former
Navajo uranium miners and their survivors had brought suit against the
United States government for compensatory damages suffered as a result of
exposure to radiation during uranium mining.57 Among the allegations was
that the United States Public Health Service (PHS) had conducted a pro-
spective epidemiological study of a cohort of uranium miners from 1949 to
1960 to see if they were at increased risk for cancer, lung disease, and other
problems. The miners had an annual physical exam in 1950, 1951, 1953,
and every three years thereafter until 1960. They were told that the exam
was part of a study of the health of uranium miners, but were not warned of
any risks that were suspected in uranium mining or told of the purpose of
the study.5 8
The study was discontinued in 1960 and replaced by the more accurate
annual sputum cytology studies.5 9 In responding to the suggestion that it
was a violation of the rights of the miners in this Tuskegee-like study60 to
withhold the real aims of the study, the court said simply:
The PHS epidemiological study protocol and the conduct of the
PHS physicians participating in the study and the limits on the
information given to the miners studied were consistent with the
medical ethical and legal standards of the 1940s and 1950s. It was
not until the 1964 and 1965 period that federal guidelines were
established for the conduct of federally-funded research projects.
This followed discussions in the legal community, the medical
community and congressional hearings after the Nuremberg trials
of Nazi war criminals engaged in human experimentation in the
German concentration camps. The PHS physicians here were not
experimenting on human beings. They were gathering data to be
used for the establishment of enforceable maximum standards of
radiation exposure in uranium mines.6'
Judge Copple's logic for concluding that the decision, not to tell the Nav-
ajo miners of the risk of uranium radiation to them, was a "discretionary"
one and thus not covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is dis-
57. Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 993 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 768 F.2d 1059
(9th Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 994-95.
59. Id. at 997.
60. In the now infamous Tuskegee study, poor black men with syphilis were followed for
decades so that the natural course of syphilis could be studied. The men were told only that
they had "bad blood," and were never informed either of their diagnosis, or the purpose of the
study, even after penicillin was discovered. The study was not discontinued until 1972. See
supra note 16.
61. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 997-98 (emphasis added).
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turbing. He borrows a hypothetical, used by Judge Jenkins in Allen v.
United States, 62 to illustrate the extent of the federal discretionary authority
under the FTCA:
Suppose a high level decision maker says, "International pressures
make open-air atomic testing highly necessary. Time is of the es-
sence. We cannot tell our own people. We just need to do it and
do it fast as we can. We know as a result of such testing some
people are going to get hurt. We can't tell them they are going to
get hurt. We can't even warn them what to do to minimize or
prevent the hurt. In order to preserve our way of life some people
unknown to them and unknown to us are going to give their all for
the good of all.",
63
Judges Jenkins and Copple both concluded that those injured by such a
government policy-one in blatant disregard of human rights and human
life-would have no redress because the harm would be the result of a dis-
cretionary act.6 Judge Copple went further. He concluded that the PHS
decision not to inform the research subjects of the risk of continued exposure
to uranium was justified "based on considerations of political and national
security feasibility factors.",65
62. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988).
63. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 1012 (emphasis added) (quoting Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 338).
President George Bush, using similar language to justify the deployment of American troops
to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1990, wanted to protect "our American way of life." West-
lake, American Way, Chi. Tribune, Sept. 12, 1990, at 18, col. 5.
64. An earlier case involving the Government's act of selecting a particular strain of bac-
teria for use in a secret, simulated biological warfare attack on San Francisco in 1950 came to a
similar conclusion. The court ruled that the family of a man who died as a result of exposure
to the bacteria had no recourse because the selection of the particular strain of bacteria was a
discretionary function. Nevin v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 815 (1983).
65. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 1012. In 1986 Congressman Edward J. Markey (D. Mass.)
released records detailing a series of experiments conducted by the Government from 1940 to
1971 to test various aspects of radiation exposure. Many of the experiments had been pub-
lished in journals. They included the injection of radium, thorium, and plutonium into pa-
tients believed to have a limited lifespan; exposure of the testicles of Oregon prisoners to test
the effects of radiation on human fertility; and the intentional release of radioactive iodine in
Idaho, followed in at least one case by subjects drinking milk from cows that had grazed on
land contaminated with radioactivity. Only the Oregon prisoner experiments resulted in any
litigation, as a result of which the U.S. Attorney in Portland, Oregon asked state officials to
cancel a program of following up released prisoners to examine their health status. For details
on the radiation studies, which were conducted at some of the Nation's leading educational
institutions and hospitals, see generally STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY CONSERVA-
TION AND POWER, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUINEA PIGS: THREE DE-
CADES OF RADIATION EXPERIMENTS ON U.S. CITIZENS (Comm. Print 1986). The 1986
excuses for the experiments were predictable. Dr. J.W. Thiessen of the U.S. Department of
Energy's Office of Health and Environmental Research defended the studies saying:
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THE DEEP DIVING EXPERIMENT
The final lower court case citing the Nuremberg Code is a civilian tort
action involving a nontherapeutic experiment-a series of simulated deep sea
dives conducted at Duke University in 1981.66 The experiment, called At-
lantis III, involved research into high pressure nervous syndrome. The re-
search subject, Leonard Whitlock, was an experienced diver with a degree in
oceanographic technology. He had made approximately 1,500 scuba dives,
200-300 tethered air dives, 200 oxygen surface decompression dives, 50
mixed gas dives, and 6 helium-oxygen saturation dives to between 450 and
680 feet. He had also participated in an earlier experiment called Atlantis I.
The Atlantis III plan was to simulate a dive to 2250 feet, a new world
record.67
Prior to the experiment, Whitlock signed an informed consent form advis-
ing him of risks of possible lung collapse, production of fluid, hearing loss,
inflammation of the ear, and sinusitis. Decompression risks were described
as including death, disability, and joint pain. "Unknown risks" were also
possible because "the research was experimental." After the dive Whitlock
suffered permanent organic brain damage and brought suit alleging, among
other things, fraudulent and negligent failure to warn of the risk of organic
brain disease. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the
court granted.68
On the issue of informed consent, the court cited the Nuremberg Code as
authoritative in the nontherapeutic context, setting forth the entire text of
principles 1, 7, and 8. The court continued:
Two important differences to note between the Nuremberg Code
and § 90-21.13 [North Carolina's informed consent statute] are
that the subjective consent of the subject is always required under the
Nuremberg Code whereas under § 90-21.13 a health care provider
may escape liability if a reasonable person would have consented if
the proper disclosure of information had been made; and more im-
portantly for the purposes of this case the Nuremberg Code requires
the researcher to make known to the subject all hazards reasonably
to be expected and the possible effects upon the health and person
You have to put yourself back in those years. They used humans because there was
an urgency to find if radiation safety standards were adequate .... Actual radiation
exposure to those people was extremely low. We wouldn't do it now the way they
did it then. But it's hard to say they were wrong even then.
Tye, Radiation Tests Employed People as Guinea Pigs, Boston Globe, Oct. 25, 1986, at 3, col. I.
66. Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340
(4th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 1465-66.
68. Id.
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of the subject whereas § 90-21.13 only requires the health care pro-
vider to apprise the patient of the "usual and most frequent risks
and hazards" of the procedure.6 9
The court thus used the Nuremberg Code as the legal standard for disclo-
sure, properly concluding that "the degree of required disclosure of risks is
higher in the nontherapeutic context."' 70 In applying this principle, how-
ever, the court found that Whitlock failed to provide any evidence that there
was a foreseeable or known risk of organic brain damage associated with the
Atlantis III experiment. The physician supervisor knew of no such injury
that had ever been seen as a result of deep diving experiments, and none was
mentioned in the literature. Therefore, it could not be concluded that or-
ganic brain disease was a "reasonably foreseeable risk" that must be
disclosed.7'
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE NUREMBERG CODE
The Supreme Court has mentioned the Nuremberg Code in one opinion,
United States v. Stanley,7 2 in 1987. A related opinion involving access to
Government records of Government-sponsored nontherapeutic experiments,
decided two years earlier, helps provide a context for the Stanley
experiments.
In 1953, only five years after the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code,
Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), issued or-
ders for secret experiments to be conducted into the use of biological and
chemical agents to alter human behavior under the code name MKUL-
TRA. 73 These experiments were in response to "brain washing techniques"
used on American soldiers in Korea, and the desperation these techniques
caused. CIA officials wanted to know how these techniques worked and
whether they could be countered. Almost two-hundred researchers at eighty
institutions were eventually hired by the CIA to conduct studies, several of
which involved experiments where researchers secretly administered danger-
ous drugs, such as LSD, to uninformed human subjects. At least two sub-
jects died as a result of the experiments, and many others suffered serious
health consequences. 74 This type of human experimentation was finally ex-
pressly forbidden by a presidential executive order in 1982.75
69. Id. at 1471 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1472.
72. 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 161 (1984).
74. Id. at 162.
75. Id. at 162 n.2 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.10, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1982)).
Mengele's Birthmark
In 1973 the CIA Director ordered all records pertaining to MKULTRA
destroyed. In 1977 the CIA located some 8,000 pages, mostly financial
records, that had inadvertently survived the 1973 destruction. Agency Di-
rector Stansfield Turner notified the Senate Select Committee of their exist-
ence and provided the committee with a confidential list of all MKULTRA
researchers and institutions. Shortly thereafter, John Sims and Sidney Wolfe
filed a Freedom of Information suit seeking the list of the institutions and
researchers.76 By the time the case reached the United States Supreme
Court, fifty-eight of the institutions had agreed to be identified, but the
Agency continued to resist disclosing the names of the other institutions and
of the individual researchers on the grounds that they were "intelligence
sources" that the CIA Director had a right to protect.77 The Supreme
Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, agreed with the
CIA and justified almost all of the CIA's information-collecting activities as
required by the national defense and the security of the United States. All of
the Justices concurred in this result.78
Two years later, in 1987, the Supreme Court got its first chance to decide
if the Nuremberg Code applied to the United States Army under whose aus-
pices the Nuremberg Medical Trial was held. Technically speaking, the
Court decided only that an active duty serviceman could not sue the Gov-
ernment for injuries sustained as a result of experimentation that violated the
Nuremberg Code. On the other hand, it is fair to conclude that the Code is
almost meaningless in the military context if servicemen are denied money
damages for its flagrant violation. To have a right without a remedy is simi-
lar to concluding the Nuremberg Code is an ethical code without legal
standing.
The Army became interested in mind-altering drugs during the early
1950's, at about the same time as the CIA. The Army's interest stemmed
from intelligence information revealing that other countries were purchasing
large quantities of hallucinogenic drugs and from concern that these drugs
might be used as an alternative to nuclear weapons, rendering our military
forces harmless without damage to the environment or buildings. As a re-
sult at least thirteen research contracts were funded by the Army, and be-
tween 1955 and 1967 the Army conducted numerous in-house studies of
psychedelics on military and civilian personnel.79
Studies were done to determine how men under the influence of LSD per-
76. Id. at 162-63 & n.5.
77. Id. at 163 & n.7.
78. Id. at 161, 181.
79. The issue of experimentation in the U.S. Military is discussed in more detail in AN-
NAS, GLANTZ & KATZ, supra note 13, at 305-11.
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formed their military duties, and also to determine if the administration of
LSD could be used as a method to obtain information during interrogation.
Many subjects were neither informed of the experiment's nature nor the sub-
stance used. The problem does not appear to have been lack of guidelines,
but lack of compliance. By 1953 the Secretary of Defense had essentially
adopted the Nuremberg Code for protection of experimental volunteers in
research, but the guidelines were classified "Top Secret" until 1974 (when
new standards were adopted by the Army, Navy, and Air Force). It is un-
clear how seriously they were taken.80
James Stanley, an Army serviceman, volunteered to test the effectiveness
of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare in February
1958.81 Unknown to him, and without his consent, LSD was secretly ad-
ministered to him pursuant to an Army plan to study the effects of the drug
on humans. As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley suffered from hallu-
cinations and periods of incoherence and memory loss. This impaired his
military performance, and he also on occasion woke in the middle of the
night and "without reason, violently beat his wife and children, later being
unable to recall the entire incident.' 82 He was discharged from the military
in 1969, and one year later his marriage ended because of the personality
changes allegedly induced by LSD. In 1975 Stanley received a letter from
the Army soliciting his cooperation in a follow-up study of the "volunteers
who participated" in the 1958 LSD studies.83 This was the Government's
first notification to Stanley that he had been given LSD in 1958. Having
been denied compensation for injury by the Army, Stanley filed suit under
the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging negligence in the administration, su-
pervision, and follow-up monitoring of the drug research program.
84
In an extraordinarily technical and abstract decision, Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion for a Court split five to four.85 Without in any way characteriz-
ing the actions of the Army as unusual, Justice Scalia concluded that permit-
ting Stanley to sue the Army would be a judicial intrusion upon military
matters that would disrupt the Army itself and "would call into question
military discipline and decision-making."816 The Court would permit a suit
in a civilian court "to halt or prevent the constitutional violation" of a ser-
viceman's rights; but the Court held that such a violation provides no justifi-
80. Id. at 308.
81. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 671-72.
84. Id. at 672.
85. Id. at 671.
86. Id. at 682.
Mengele's Birthmark
cation for departing from the general rule that injuries that "arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service" shall not give rise to a cause
of action for money damages.8 7 Even though this conclusion has the effect
of granting military officials unqualified immunity for intentionally injuring
individual servicemen, the Court refused to recognize the possible conse-
quences of this effect.
Doesn't the experiment performed on Stanley so offend not only constitu-
tional rights, but also basic human decency and civilized standards of con-
duct, such that a remedy is required in a civilized country? The four
dissenting judges thought so, and based this conclusion firmly and squarely
upon the Nuremberg Code. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself, would
have found that the conduct at issue in Stanley could not "arise out of or in
the course of activity incident to service" because the conduct "is so far
beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply can-
not be considered a part of the military mission."88 In her words, the Feres
doctrine
surely cannot insulate defendants from liability for deliberate and
calculated exposure of otherwise healthy military personnel to
medical experimentation without their consent, outside of any
combat, combat training, or military exigency, and for no other
reason than to gather information on the effect of lysergic acid
diethylamide on human beings. No judicially crafted rule should
insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing human exper-
imentation alleged to have occurred in this case.8 9
Justice O'Connor then went on to directly quote the Nuremberg Code and
Justice Brennan's dissent:
[T]he United States military played an instrumental role in the
criminal prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented with
human beings during the Second World War[,] . . .and the stan-
dards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge
the behavior of the defendants stated that the "voluntary consent
of the human subject is absolutely essential ... to satisfy moral,
ethical and legal concepts. .. ." If this principle is violated the very
least that society can do is to see that the victims are compensated,
as best they can be, by the perpetrators. I am prepared to say that
our Constitution's promise of due process of law guarantees this
much.90
Justice Brennan wrote the other dissent, which was joined by Justices
87. Id. at 683-84.
88. Id. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
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Marshall and Stevens. Justice Brennan began by characterizing the case as
one in which "the Government of the United States treated thousands of its
citizens as though they were laboratory animals."91 He argued that if the
majority is correct that our Constitution bars Stanley from recovery, then
"the Court's decision, though legally necessary, would expose a tragic flaw
in that document."92 Justice Brennan, however, argued that the majority
abdicated its responsibility to protect constitutional rights and that the Con-
stitution required a remedy for his injuries. Brennan framed his argument
with the Nuremberg Code, and specifically cited its first principle, "The vol-
untary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." After quoting
the text of the last two lines of the first principle, he stated, "[T]he United
States military developed the Code, which applies to all citizens-soldiers as
well as civilians.",93
A 1959 Army Staff Study, quoted by Brennan, noted that "in intelligence,
the stakes involved and the interests of national security may permit a more
tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values, but not legal limits, through
necessity." 94 It concluded, nonetheless, that legal liability for the LSD ex-
periments could only be avoided by covering them up. A Senate Report
later concurred with the Army's assessment. Brennan argued, "Serious vio-
lations of the constitutional rights of soldiers must be exposed and pun-
ished." 95 He agreed with the majority that an injunction could be obtained:
"An injunction, however, comes too late for those already injured; for these
victims, 'it is damages or nothing.' ,9
Justice Brennan went on to demonstrate that the cases granting absolute
immunity are relevant to the analysis. Such cases, he stated, demonstrate
that only qualified immunity is necessary to support the public policy and
military discipline objectives relied on by the majority. Moreover, as he
properly noted, the people who performed the experiment on Stanley were
likely civilians in any event, so that military discipline was not even impli-
cated in this case. Brennan concluded his opinion by quoting Hans Jonas:
The soldier's case is instructive: Subject to the most unilateral dis-
cipline, forced to risk mutilation and death, conscripted without,
perhaps against, his will-he is still conscripted with his capacities
to act, to hold his own or fail in situations, to meet real challenges
for real stakes. Though a mere 'number' to the High Command,
91. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 687.
94. Id. at 688.
95. Id. at 690.
96. Id.
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he is not a token and not a thing. (Imagine what he would say if it
turned out that the war was a game staged to sample observations
on his endurance, courage, or cowardice.) 97
Justice Brennan then continued in his own words:
The subject of experimentation who has not volunteered is treated
as an object, a sample. James Stanley will receive no compensation
for this indignity. A test providing absolute immunity for inten-
tional constitutional torts only when such immunity was essential
to maintenance of military discipline would "take into account the
special importance of defending our Nation without completely
abandoning the freedoms that make it worth defending. .. ."
Soldiers ought not be asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to
their essential human dignity.9
8
DESERT SHIELD
As a final example, in late December 1990, the FDA granted the Depart-
ment of Defense a waiver from the informed consent requirements of the
Nuremberg Code and existing federal law and regulations to use unapproved
drugs and vaccines on the soldiers involved in Desert Shield.99 The basis of
this waiver was military expediency. In the words of the Department of
Defense: "In all peace time applications, we believe strongly in informed
consent and ethical foundations .... But military combat is different."" °
The rationale was that informed consent under combat conditions was "not
feasible" because some troops might object and refuse to consent, and the
military could not tolerate such refusals because of "military combat exigen-
cies." '°  It is perhaps not remarkable that the FDA granted the request
waiver and soon thereafter approved a number of unapproved drugs as well
as a vaccine for botulism to be administered to the troops. °2 It did not
escape everyone's attention, however, that this was the first time since World
War II that any official government agency had politically sanctioned the
direct violation of the Nuremberg Code (which makes no exception either
for members of the military or for wartime expediencies).10 3 The United
97. Id. at 707-08 (quoting Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimentation with
Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 219, 235-36 (1969)).
98. Id. at 708 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
99. Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics; Determination That Informed
Consent Is Not Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1990).
100. Id. at 52,815.
101. Id.
102. Kolata, Troops May Get Unlicensed Drug, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991, at Al0, col. 6.
103. Annas & Grodin, Our Guinea Pigs in the Gulf, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at A21, col.
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States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to enjoin the regu-
lation without even mentioning the Nuremberg Code. 1 In the court's view
this was a military command decision not to be questioned by the judiciary:
"The primary purpose of administering the drugs is military not scien-
tific. ' ' 10 5 The New York Times agreed, saying that "the military is acting
more like Florence Nightingale than Joseph Mengele."' 6
CONCLUSION
Prior to World War II, human experimentation in the United States was
generally viewed by the courts as an extreme and illegitimate activity that
amounted to a "deviation" from medical practice. Courts frequently in-
sisted that such deviation was itself evidence of malpractice. Hawthorne's
Aylmer, for example, was surely guilty of malpractice under these standards,
and probably of manslaughter. By World War II, deviation that was not too
extreme, and that was done with the patient's informed consent, was seen as
legitimate. No "nontherapeutic" experiment was reviewed in American
courts prior to World War II.
After World War II, the brutal Nazi "experiments" were seldom referred
to at all in United States courts. Human experimentation became a main-
stream, legitimate, and valued activity. Although it continued to deviate
from "standard medical practice," the goal was usually to test a hypothesis.
In short, human experimentation moved from the realm of quackery and
alchemy to the realm of science.
In this context it is perhaps not surprising that a deep theoretical division
developed between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimentation. The
former (the exclusive type reviewed by the courts before the War) was reha-
bilitated, with almost exclusive concern focusing on informed consent. In
this regard, principle one of the Nuremberg Code, although rarely cited,
became the primary justification for therapeutic experimentation. Much less
attention was paid to the other nine principles.
On the other hand, just as "therapeutic experimentation" tended to be
viewed as just another type of therapy; "nontherapeutic experimentation"
tended to be viewed as the only kind of true "experimentation" and thus the
only kind of research activity to which the Nuremberg Code-a document
fundamentally about nontherapeutic experimentation-applied. This is re-
104. Doe & Doe v. Sullivan & Cheney, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1991), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1702, appealfiled, No. 91-5019 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1991).
105. Id., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10.
106. The Ethics of Troop Vaccination, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991; at A22, col. 1 (editorial).
For the argument against the regulation, see Annas & Grodin, Treating the Troops.- Commen-
tary, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (Mar./Apr. 1991).
Mengele's Birthmark
flected in the case law. The types of experiments in which American judges
have found the Nuremberg Code to be a useful guide for setting standards
have involved nontherapeutic experiments often conducted without consent:
psychosurgery on an involuntarily confined mental patient; secretly adminis-
tering mind-altering drugs to unsuspecting members of the military and ci-
vilians; testing the effects of radiation on members of the military; and
monitoring the physical effects of radiation on unsuspecting uranium miners.
Many, though certainly not all, of these experiments were justified by na-
tional security considerations and the Cold War. The wartime mentality
expressed by the CIA and the Army to justify its LSD experiments, and the
Army to justify its atomic bomb exposure experiments, is substantially iden-
tical to one of the major defenses presented by the Nazi physicians at Nu-
remberg. Remarkably, the Nuremberg Code appears to have had no effect
on medical researchers even in the 1950's.
Given our belief that the Nazis like Mengele were "others" and not like
us, it is probably not surprising that so little attention has actually been paid
to the Nuremberg Code in United States courts. However, since American
judges promulgated the Code under both natural and international law stan-
dards, it is disturbing that we have not taken it more seriously in areas where
there is no question that it has direct application. The most disturbing fail-
ure to apply it for the protection of research subjects is in the United States
military. Treating members of the military as property without basic human
rights should be offensive to both us and them, and should be seen as an
unacceptable and unconstitutional violation of their rights. That the
Supreme Court indirectly approves of such conduct, even in the experimen-
tal context, and directly rejects the Nuremberg Code as anything more than
a statement of ethics, is discouraging. It is very disappointing that the
Supreme Court was unable to distinguish between the military mission and
taking advantage of defenseless soldiers.
10 7
In an age that has come to see research as necessary for "progress," and
progress as the new goal for humankind, it is not surprising that therapeutic
research has been reinvented as simply therapy, and that many sick people
actually demand it as their "right."' 0 8 It should probably not even be sur-
prising that traditional "nontherapeutic research," such as phase I cancer
drug research and early research on AIDS drugs, as well as the first-of-their-
kind transplants and implants have been redefined as simply "therapy," or
107. And even if money damages could not be awarded, the criminal penalties provided at
Nuremberg should continue to apply.
108. See Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of AIDS Drug
Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771, 772, 773-78 (1989).
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sometimes "innovative therapy."'" What is surprising, however, is that
even in those instances of nontherapeutic experimentation in which the Nu-
remberg Code applies directly, we have never taken it seriously ourselves,
and have been content to say that the rights of the individual are outweighed
by national security concerns. This has been true even where those concerns
are unclear or unarticulated, and where the experiments are carried out in
secret and produce death and permanent disability.
The promise of the Nuremberg Code has not been fulfilled in the United
States. When national security is invoked, human rights continue to take
second place to the demands of state officials, and when "medical progress"
is invoked, ethics continues to take a backseat to expediency. We have yet to
succeed in eradicating our birthmark that impels us to trample human rights
and welfare when either society's welfare seems in jeopardy, or the promise
of "progress" is dangled before us. We also continue to accept this aspect of
"original sin" as part of our human nature, much the way Georgianna ac-
cepted her husband's characterization of her birthmark as hideous. This ac-
ceptance led her to agree to his lethal experiment. But her birthmark was
hideous only to the eye of one who insisted that perfection was attainable on
earth, and that immortality was a proper goal for mankind. Neither Alymer
nor Mengele will be called to account in a world that puts expediency over
ethics, and exalts progress over human rights.
Although this conclusion regards human moral progress pessimistically,
there remains at least some cause of optimism. The judges at Nuremberg
postulated the Nuremberg Code on a natural law basis, saying that "the
principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of
public conscience" must be followed."' Thus, although some humans will
pursue their own ends brutally and in secret, human "nature's" perception
of right and wrong condemns experiments not consistent with the Nurem-
berg Code. Moreover, prior public disclosure could significantly affect be-
havior for the better. Mengele and Hawthorne again provide useful
metaphors. Mengele reportedly often said, "I am a laboratory mole. The
laboratory is my secret garden." 1 1' And another story of Hawthorne's, Rap-
paccini's Daughter, centers on the walled garden in which a physician-scien-
109. The world's first artificial heart was described as "therapy," Karp v. Cooley, 349 F.
Supp. 827, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974), as was the world's first
permanent artificial heart implant. See Annas, Death and the Magic Machine: Informed Con-
sent to the Artificial Heart, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 89, 99-100 (1987).
110. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 183 (1946-1949).
111. Aziz, supra note 6, at 117.
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tist experimented with deadly plants, as well as with his daughter and her
lover. Of Rappaccini, Hawthorne tells us, "he cares infinitely more for sci-
ence than for mankind .... He would sacrifice human life, his own among
the rest, or whatever else was dearest to him, for the sake of adding so much
as a grain of mustard-seed to the great help of his accumulated knowl-
edge.""' 2 Measures that effectively keep the "moles" above ground, open
the "secret gardens" to public inspection, and require public review of the
proposals of scientists who would sacrifice even themselves for knowledge,
are all measures that can help to protect the rights and welfare of research
subjects and help us preserve our humanity.
112. HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 91, 99-100.
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